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Abstract
This paper presents algorithms for non-zero sum nonlinear constrained dynamic games with full information. Such problems emerge
when multiple players with action constraints and differing objectives interact with the same dynamic system. They model a wide range
of applications including economics, defense, and energy systems. We show how to exploit the temporal structure in projected gradient
and Douglas-Rachford (DR) splitting methods. The resulting algorithms converge locally to open-loop Nash equilibria (OLNE) at linear
rates. Furthermore, we extend stagewise Newton method to find a local feedback policy around an OLNE. In the of linear dynamics
and polyhedral constraints, we show that this local feedback controller is an approximated feedback Nash equilibrium (FNE). Numerical
examples are provided.
Key words: Constrained Dynamic Games; Projected Gradient; Douglas-Rachford Algorithm.
1 Introduction
This paper describes numerical algorithms for finite-horizon,
constrained, discrete-time dynamic games with full infor-
mation. In this setup, agents with different objectives but
coupled constraints choose inputs to a dynamic system. Due
to coupling in the constraints, we examine generalized Nash
equilibrium problems (GNEP). The formulation and all re-
sults in this paper automatically apply to standard Nash
equilibrium problems when the action constraints are not
coupled. The dynamic system can be naturally discrete-time
or emerge from discretization of a differential game [1–4].
Dynamic games have many applications including pursuit-
evasion [5], active-defense [6, 7], economics [8] and the
smart grid [9]. Despite a wide array of applications, the com-
putational methods for dynamic games are considerably less
developed than the single-agent case of optimal control.
Our previous work [10] extended stagewise Newton al-
gorithm and differential dynamic programming (DDP),
which originated from single-agent optimal control, to un-
constrained non-zero-sum dynamic games. We proved that
the methods converge quadratically to an open-loop Nash
equilibrium (OLNE), the resulting closed-loop policies
are local feedback O(ε2)-Nash equilibria (FNEs), and that
both algorithms enjoyed a linear complexity with respect
to the horizon. This paper generalizes [10] to the case of
constrained dynamic games.
Email addresses: dixxx047@umn.edu (Bolei Di),
alampers@umn.edu (Andrew Lamperski).
Below we review generalized Nash equilibrium problems
and their relation to variational inequalities. Additionally,
we describe projected gradient and Douglas-Rachford split-
ting methods, which can solve variational inequalities (VI)
problems. For a more detailed review of relevant game the-
ory literature, see [10].
General Nash equilibrium problems (GNEP) study games
with constraints that couple different players’ strategies [11].
For games with continuous variables, necessary conditions
for the solution of a GNEP can be formulated as a varia-
tional inequality (VI). These inequalities can be solved via
generic VI methods or classic feasibility problem methods,
such as Newton’s method [12] or others [13]. First order VI
methods require calculation of gradients, while second order
methods require inverting Hessian matrices. Naı¨ve imple-
mentations of these calculations respectively require O(T 2)
and O(T 3) steps, where T is the number of stages. Our stage-
wise Newton method from [10] exploits dynamic structure
to compute gradients, Hessians, and inverse Hessians with
O(T ) complexity. Below, we describe two VI algorithms in
greater detail.
Projected gradient algorithms alternate between taking gra-
dient descent steps and projecting onto constraints. They
have been well studied for optimization [14] and varia-
tional inequality (VI) problems [15], and proven to converge
linearly in both cases. This paper describes how the pro-
jected gradient method can be applied to constrained dy-
namic games, including convergence conditions and conver-
gence rate of the algorithm.
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Douglas-Rachford (DR) splitting methods alternate between
solving two VI problems when applied to constrained game
problems. Typically one problem corresponds to an uncon-
strained optimization or game problem, while the other cor-
responds to projection onto constraints [15]. As with the
projected gradient method, the DR method converges lin-
early [16]. In optimization, the DR method is closely related
to the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM)
[17] and has been extended to (single-agent) optimal control
problems [18, 19].
1.1 Our Contribution
We describe efficient implementations of projected gradi-
ent and Douglas-Rachford splitting methods for computing
OLNEs of constrained dynamic games. In both cases, we
show how to exploit temporal structure to achieve iterations
of O(T ) complexity. Finally, we adapted the stagewise New-
ton to solve for a feedback policy around OLNE trajectories.
In the case of games with linear dynamics and polyhedral
constraints, we show that it is an approximate (generalized)
feedback Nash equilibrium.
1.2 Paper Outline
The paper can be divided into three major parts. The first
part, Section 2, describes the problem formulations and so-
lution concepts. The second part, Section 3 on the projected
gradient method and Section 4 on the Douglas-Rachford
splitting method, describe methods for computing local
OLNE solutions. The third part focuses on local feed-
back Nash equilibria. It includes Section 5, which lays
the groundwork, and Section 6, which analyzes local FNE
for constrained dynamic games. Numerical examples are
offered in Section 7 and future extensions discussed in
Section 8.
2 Problem Formulations and Solution Concepts
We introduce some standard notation, formulate the con-
strained dynamic game problems, and introduce the associ-
ated solution concepts.
2.1 Dynamic and Static Game Formulation
The main problem of interest is a constrained, deterministic,
full-information dynamic game with N players of the form
below.
Problem 1 Constrained nonlinear dynamic game
Each player aims to minimize their own cost
min
un,t:
Jn,t(x,u) =
T
∑
k=t
cn,k(xk,u:,k) (1)
Subject to dynamic constraints fk(·) and extra constraints
gn,k(·)
s.t. xk+1 = fk(xk,u:,k) (2a)
gk(xk,u:,k)≤ 0, (2b)
xt is fixed. (2c)
k = t, t+1, . . . ,T −1. (2d)
Here, 0 ≤ t ≤ T is the starting point for a game. When
t = 0, we call it the full game, and t > 0, a subgame t. Here,
the state of the system at time k is denoted by xk ∈ Rnx .
Player n’s action at time k is given by un,k ∈ Rnun . The
vector of all players’ actions at time k is denoted u:,k =
[u>1,k,u
>
2,k, . . . ,u
>
N,k]
> ∈ Rnu . The cost for player n at time k
is cn,k(xk,u:,k). This encodes the fact that the cost for each
player can depend on the actions of all the players. We
assume that the costs are twice differentiable with locally
Lipschitz Hessians.
In later analysis, some other notation is helpful. The ac-
tions of player n from time t to T in a vector is denoted
un,t: = [u>n,t ,u>n,t+1, . . . ,u
>
n,T ]
>. The vector of actions other
than those of player n from time t to T is denoted by
u−n,t: = [u>1,t:, . . . ,u
>
n−1,t:,u
>
n+1,t:, . . . ,u
>
N,t:]
>. The vector of
states from time t to T is denoted xt: = [x>t ,x>t+1, . . . ,x
>
T ]
>
while the vector of all players’ actions from t to T is given
by u:,t: = [u>1,t:,u
>
2,t:, . . . ,u
>
N,t:]
>. x,u denote all states and ac-
tions collected over all time in a vector.
We denote the set of trajectories [x:,t:,u:,t:] satisfying the dy-
namic constraint with given xt as Dt(xt) and the extra con-
straints Gt(xt). Feasible sets of state and actions are denoted
Xt(xt) and Ut(xt) for subgame t. The subscript t or initial
condition x0 can be suppressed later in this paper indicating
values for the full game.
Note that the dynamics are deterministic, the cost for each
player in a subgame can be expressed as a function of all
following actions and given state xt , i.e., Jn,t(xt ,u:,t:). The
dynamics are implicitly substituted to eliminate x when we
use such notation. Problem 1 can be written in an equivalent
static game form for ease of notation and analysis.
Problem 2 Static form of game Problem 1
A static form equivalent to Problem 1 is denoted
min
un,t:
Jn,t(xt ,u:,t:) (3a)
s.t. u:,t: ∈ Ut(xt) (3b)
2.2 Solution Concept of Games
We focus on local open-loop Nash equilibria and feedback
Nash equilibria in this paper. Technically, we are studying
generalized Nash equilibria, since players’ actions can be
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coupled in the constraints [20]. However, for simplicity, we
will refer to them as Nash equilibria.
Definition 1 (Local) open-loop Nash equilibrium
An open-loop Nash equilibrium (OLNE) for subgame t of
problem 1 and 2 with one specific state xt is a set of actions
u?:,t: ∈ Ut(xt) such that
Jn,t(xt , [un,t:,u?−n,t:])≥ Jn(xt ,u?:,t:), n = 1,2, . . . ,N (4)
Furthermore, if (4) only holds for un,t: ∈ Un,t(xt) in a neigh-
borhood of u?n,t:, it is called a local open-loop Nash equilib-
rium (local-OLNE).
Problem 1 and Problem 2 are equivalent in terms of a local
OLNE. An OLNE does not dynamically adjust if the state
changes. In contrast, a feedback Nash equilibrium for dy-
namic games Problem 1 requires players to be able to mea-
sure the state xk at each step and execute a step-by-step pol-
icy u:,k = φ ?:,k(xk) to account for changes in the state. FNE
has the valuable property of being subgame perfect [21].
Definition 2 (Local) feedback Nash equilibrium
A collection of feedback policies un,k = φ ?n,k(xk), with u¯n,k =
φ ∗n,k(x¯k) ∀n ∈ {1,2, ...,N},∀k ∈ {0,1, . . . ,T − 1} is said to
be a feedback Nash equilibrium of the full game if no player
can benefit from changing their policy unilaterally for any
subgame t, i.e.,
Jn,t(xt ,φ ?:,t:)≤ Jn,t(xt , [φn,t:,φ ?−n,t:]), ∀t ∈ {0,1, ...,T}, (5)
where Jn,t(xt ,φ:,t:) indicates the total cost of player n when
all players follow policy φ:,t: for subgame t. All policies
should be compatible with the constraints. Furthermone,
if (5) only holds around [x¯, u¯] ∈ D ∩ G and the resulting
trajectories remain in a neighborhood of [x¯, u¯], it is called
a local feedback Nash equilibrium (local-FNE).
This definition only applies to Problem 1 because Problem 2
does not have explicit state information. In this definition,
[x¯, u¯] must be an OLNE since (5) could be violated at x¯t oth-
erwise. Thus, we focus on local FNEs that are built around
OLNEs in this paper. Ideally, an FNE is solved via the Bell-
man recursion, which originated from optimal control prob-
lems, and was extended to dynamic games [21,22]. Instead
of solving the minimizing action at each stage, equilibrium
of stagewise games are computed via the following recur-
sion
V ?n,T+1(xT+1) = 0 (6a)
Q?n,k(xk,u:,k) = cn,k(xk,u:,k)+V
?
n,k+1( fk(xk,u:,k)) (6b)
V ?n,k(xk) = minφn,k
Q?n,k(xk,φn,k(xk)), s.t. gk(xk,φ:,k(xk))≤ 0
(6c)
k = 0,1, ...,T. (6d)
Here V ?n,k(xk) and Q
?
n,k(xk,u:,k) are referred to as equilibrium
value functions for player n at time step k. Note that (6c)
defines a parametric static game in terms of the u:,k variable
at step k and parameterized by xk. For dynamic games with
quadratic costs, linear dynamics and polyhedral constraints,
the analytical FNE can be obtained in theory as described
in Section 5 and Appendix B. In general, this backward re-
cursion is intractable, so we focus on solving it approxi-
mately around an OLNE trajectory. Note that the game ends
at k = T , and setting V ?n,T+1(xT+1) = 0 is only for ease of
notation and that by construction, V ∗n,t(xt) = Jn,t(xt ,φ ∗:,t:) for
t = 0, . . . ,T .
2.3 Variational Inequality (VI) Formulation
For continuous-variable games, variational inequalities (VIs)
give a necessary condition for the solution of generalized
Nash equilibrium problems [15]. We describe the VI formu-
lation of the full game, which starts at t = 0. The formulation
for games starting at t ≥ 1 is simular. We omit the depen-
dency on x0, stack all of the gradient vector
∂Jn,0(u,x0)
∂un,:
and
define
J (u) =
[
∂J1,0
∂u1,:
∂J2,0
∂u2,:
· · · ∂JN,0∂uN,:
]>
. (7)
Note that J (u) has the same dimension as u. When the de-
pendence on x0 must be emphasized, we denote the corre-
sponding function by J (x0,u). The VI formulation of the
full game, Problem 2, is as following.
Problem 3 VI formulation of static game
Find u? ∈ U s.t. J >(u)(u−u?)≥ 0, ∀u ∈ U . (8)
Note that u? is the solution of VI formulation is only nec-
essary to u? being a local OLNE to Problem 2. To ensure
sufficiency, it should also be checked if each player’s ac-
tion is a local minimizer to their objective. Two sufficient
conditions for player n’s cost to be locally minimized are
1) ∂Jn∂un,: (u
?) 6= 0 and 2) ∂Jn∂un,: (u?) = 0 and Jn(un,:) is locally
convex. If u? is a local minimizer for all players, then it is
also a local OLNE solution to 2. We refer to this procedure
as playerwise local minimizer check.
2.4 Sufficient Conditions for Existence of Solutions
A commonly applicable sufficient condition for a solution
of the VI problem to exist is that J (u) is locally strongly
monotone and U is convex. Another sufficient condition is
that, U is compact convex and J (u) is continuous on U [15].
In the case if Jn(x0,u) is convex w.r.t. un,:, the playerwise
local minimizer check described above is satisfied for all
players, and therefore the game has an OLNE solution. If
J (x0,u) is continuous in x0 (which is guaranteed by our
differentiability assumption) and locally strongly monotone
with respect to u, the dynamic games can be solved for all
states near xt . This guarantees the existence of a local FNE.
3
3 The Projected Gradient Method
The projected gradient method for monotone VI problems
was explained in details in [15]. We briefly describe the
method and its basic application to Problem 3, which helps
find an OLNE for Problem 2. We show how this leads to an
algorithm for constrained dynamic games.
3.1 Projected Gradient Method for VI
The projection algorithm follows an iterative update
ut+1 =ΠU (ut −ρJ (u)), (9)
where ρ is a step size and Π is the projection operator. The
algorithm converges linearly with constant (1+ρ2L2−2ρµ)
when J (u) is µ-strongly monotone, L-Lipschitz, i.e.,
(J (u)−J (v))>(u− v)≥ µ ‖u− v‖2 (10a)
‖J (u)−J (v)‖ ≤ L‖u− v‖ , (10b)
and that ρL2 ≤ 2µ [15]. There exists a small ρ that guar-
antees the linear convergence, although smaller ρ leads to
slower convergence. To apply the projection method to con-
strained dynamic games, we need procedures to compute
the gradient J (u) and the projection onto U .
Given feasible u¯ and x¯ such that [x¯, u¯] ∈ D, the gradient
J (u¯) can be found efficiently by first performing a backward
pass (11) [10], then extracting and stacking corresponding
elements in ∂Jn(u,x0)∂u:,k
∣∣∣
u¯
.
Ωn,T+1 = 0 (11a)
Ωn,k = M1xn,k +Ωn,k+1Ak (11b)
∂Jn(u,x0)
∂u:,k
∣∣∣
u¯
= M1un,k +Ωn,k+1Bk (11c)
k = T,T −1, . . . ,0, (11d)
where Ak,Bk,Mk are derivatives of the dynamics and cost
evaluated around x¯, u¯ defined in (34) in Section 6.
The projection onto U requires solving a constrained optimal
control problem with quadratic step costs, which can be
solved via classic optimal control methods [23].
Problem 4 Constrained optimal control around nominal
trajectory u¯
min
u
J(u) =
T
∑
k=0
∥∥u:,k− u¯:,k∥∥2 (12a)
s.t. gk(xk,u:,k)≤ 0, (12b)
xk+1 = fk(xk,u:,k) (12c)
k = 0,1, ...,T −1. (12d)
The notation J is overloaded and is different from that of
the formulations of Problem 1 and 2. Note that a trajec-
tory found via projected gradient method is a solution to the
VI problem but not necessarily the game. A playerwise lo-
cal minimizer check needs to be done as discussed in Sec-
tion 2.3. We summarize the projected gradient method in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Projected Gradient Method for Constrained
Dynamic Games
Generate an initial trajectory of actions u¯
loop
Compute gradient J (u¯) according to (11)
Update u¯← u¯−ρJ (u¯)
Solve Problem 4 around u¯, assign the solution to u
Compare u¯ and u to check convergence
Set u¯← u
end loop
Perform convexity check for u¯
4 The Douglas-Rachford Operator Splitting Method
This section concerns with solving an OLNE with the
Douglas-Rachford splitting method, which is an alternative
to the projected gradient method. The DR splitting method,
in its most general form, finds the vector w that solves a
monotone inclusion problem of the form
0 ∈Θw+Φw (13)
where Θ and Φ are two maximally monotone operators in
this section. The DR algorithm is defined by the iteration
wt+1 = [(1−α)I+αRΘRΦ]wt . (14)
RΘ := 2rΘ− I is called the reflected resolvent of Θ where rΘ
is the resolvent of Θ. The same notation applies for operator
Φ. α is a constant such that α ∈ (0,1). The key steps are
solving for the two operators’ resolvents, which we elaborate
in the case of constrained dynamic games in this section. The
DR splitting method has been proven to converge linearly in
cases when at least one operator has stronger properties such
as strong monotonicity and Lipschitz continuity. See [16]
for more details.
4.1 VI Reformulation of Static Game with States
For ease of notation we interpret [x,u] as a column vector
vertically stacking x and u in this section. We create an
extended gradient Jxu([x,u]) prepending nx of zeros in front
of J (u), i.e.,
Jxu([x,u]) =
[
0
J (u)
]
∈ Rnx+nu (15)
and use it to reformulate Problem 3 equivalently as
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Problem 5 VI formulation of static game with extended
gradient
Find [x?,u?] ∈D∩G (16a)
s.t. J >xu([x,u])([x,u]− [x?,u?])≥ 0 (16b)
∀[x,u] ∈D∩G (16c)
Problem 5 is equivalent to an inclusion problem, whenD and
G are convex and Jxu is strongly monotone as explained in
Appendix A.1. Note that x is also a decision variable in this
formulation. This VI problem can also be formulated as an
inclusion problem such that we can apply the DR-splitting
method.
Problem 6 Inclusion problem form of the static game
Problem 2
0 ∈ (ηJxu+ND+NG)([x?,u?]) (17)
where ND and NG indicate the normal cone operators of
N and G, and η is a positive regularization constant. The
smaller the η , the more regularized the problems are, but the
slower the convergence would be. η should be tuned so that
the relevant problems in Section 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 are either
strongly convex of monotone for better solvability. Note that
there are three adding operators in Problem 6, in contrast to
(13) which has only two. We can single out any one oper-
ator and combine the other two to form an inclusion prob-
lem with two adding operators and apply the DR algorithm.
The algorithm requires alternately solving two problems that
are the resolvents of different operators. Which combination
to chose ultimately depends on which resolvents are easier
to solve, which varies with the specific dynamic game and
available solvers. Ideally, when both resolvents are analyti-
cally solvable, the DR algorithm is preferred.
We summarize the implementation of the DR splitting in
Algorithm 2 and elaborate the optimization/game problems
derived from the resolvents later in this section. We use
y,z to indicate a nominal trajectory that follows the same
convention as x,u. The notation J is overloaded to indicate
costs for these different resolvent problems. For details re-
garding how the problems are derived from resolvents, see
Appendix A.2.
4.2 Singling out NG
Problem 6 becomes the following when singling out NG
0 ∈ ([ηJxu+ND]+NG)([x?,u?]) (21)
The resolvent of ηJxu +ND corresponds to solving a reg-
ularized, unconstrained dynamic game and the resolvent of
NG is the projection onto G.
Algorithm 2 Douglas-Rachford for Constrained Dynamic
Games
Generate an initial trajectory x¯, u¯, set y = x¯,z = u¯
Pick one scheme from Section 4.2, 4.3 or 4.4
loop
Set y = x¯,z = u¯
Solve the first problem in the selected section with
y,z, assign the resulting trajectory to x˜, u˜
Reset the intermediate values x˜, u˜ and y,z
[y,z]← 2[x˜, u˜]− [y,z] (18a)
Solve the second problem in the selected section with
y,z, assign the resulting trajectory to x˜, u˜
Reset the intermediate values x˜, u˜ and y,z
[y,z]← 2[x˜, u˜]− [y,z] (19)
Compute weighted average
[x¯, u¯]← (1−α)[x¯, u¯]+α[y,z] (20)
Check for convergence with x¯, u¯ and x˜, u˜
end loop
Problem 7 Regularized unconstrained dynamic game
around nominal trajectory y,z
min
un,:
Jn(x,u) =
T
∑
k=0
cn,k(xk,u:,k)+
1
2η
‖xk− yk‖2
+
1
2η
∥∥u:,k− z:,k∥∥2
n = 1,2, ...,N (22a)
s.t. xk+1 = fk(xk,u:,k) (22b)
This problem can be solved via our previously proposed
stagewise Newton or DDP methods with linear complexity
in T and quadratic convergence [10].
Problem 8 Projection of a nominal trajectory y,z onto the
extra constraints set
[x,u] =ΠG([y,z]) (23)
When the extra constraints sets are convex at each stage,
this projection is equivalent to solving the projection onto a
convex set at each stage.
4.3 Singling out ND
Problem 6 becomes the following when singling out ND
0 ∈ ([ηJxu+NG ]+ND)([x?,u?]) (24)
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The resolvent of ηJxu+NG corresponds to solving a series
of regularized, constrained static games and the resolvent of
ND is the projection onto D, which is an optimal control
problem.
Problem 9 Regularized constrained static games around
nominal trajectory y,z
min
xk,u:,k
Jn(x,u) =
T
∑
k=0
cn,k(xk,u:,k)+
1
2η
‖xk− yk‖2
+
1
2η
∥∥u:,k− z:,k∥∥2 (25a)
s.t. gk(xk,u:,k)≤ 0, (25b)
k = 0,1, ...,T −1 (25c)
Note that the objectives are not coupled cross time, therefore
this is equivalent to solving T +1 constrained static games,
which can be solved via solving the KKT conditions [20] or
other static game methods. Note that there is an additional
player with decision variable xk at each stage.
Problem 10 Projection of a nominal trajectory y,z onto
the dynamics
min
u
J(x,u) =
T
∑
k=0
‖xk− yk‖2+
∥∥u:,k− z:,k∥∥2 (26a)
s.t. xk+1 = fk(xk,u:,k) (26b)
This is an optimal control problem with quadratic step cost,
which can be solved via classic optimal control methods
[24].
4.4 Singling out ηJxu
Problem 6 becomes the following when singling out ηJxu
0 ∈ ([ND+NG ]+ηJxu)([x?,u?]) (27)
The resolvent of ND +NG corresponds to solving a con-
strained optimal control problem and the resolvent of Jxu is
a series of unconstrained optimization.
Problem 11 Constrained optimal control around nominal
trajectory y,z
min
u:,k
J(x,u) =
T
∑
k=0
‖xk− yk‖2+
∥∥u:,k− z:,k∥∥2 (28a)
s.t. gk(xk,u:,k)≤ 0, (28b)
xk+1 = fk(xk,u:,k) (28c)
k = 0,1, ...,T −1 (28d)
This is an constrained optimal control problem with
quadratic step cost, which can be solved via classic optimal
control methods [24].
Problem 12 Regularized unconstrained games around a
nominal trajectory y,z
min
xk,un,k
Jn(x,u) =
T
∑
k=0
cn,k(xk,u:,k)+
1
2η
‖xk− yk‖2
+
1
2η
∥∥u:,k− z:,k∥∥2
(29a)
Because the objectives are not coupled cross time, this
becomes T + 1 unconstrained static games, which can be
solved via classic VI methods. Similar to Problem 9, an
additional player with decision variable xk at each stage is
added.
5 Parametric Games and Feedback Equilibria
Solving a parametric game is the backbone of solving an ex-
plicit feedback Nash equilibrium of a game. We briefly de-
scribe the results of analytically solvable parametric games
and dynamic games in this section. Section 5.1 explains
the result for linear equality constrained quadratic paramet-
ric games, which is directly applied to stagewise Newton
method in Section 6. Section 5.2 describes the form of feed-
back equilibrium of linearly constrained quadratic dynamic
games, which is piecewise affine but can be exponentially
complex. We assume each player’s cost function Jn(x,u) is
continuous and strictly convex throughout this section.
The detailed development of the results can be found in the
Appendix B, which is extending the analytical solution of
linearly constrained, quadratic objective optimization and
optimal control in Chapter 7 of [23].
5.1 Linear Equality Constrained Quadratic Parametric
Game
Problem 13 is a basic form that is encountered when
approximating a constrained dynamic game, where
u = [u>1 ,u
>
2 , ...,u
>
N , ]
> collects all players’ action and x is
a vector parameter. An FNE policy u = φ(x) is desired.
This game has an explicit analytical solution with simple
assumptions.
Problem 13 Linear equality constrained quadratic para-
metric game
min
un
Jn(x,u) =
1
2

1
x
u

>
Γ11n Γ1xn Γ1un
Γx1n Γxxn Γxun
Γu1n Γuxn Γuun


1
x
u
 (30a)
6
s.t. Wx+Su+ p = 0 (30b)
The following lemma describes its solution.
Lemma 1 Given playerwise convexity of objective func-
tions, i.e., Γuun are positive definite, Problem 13 has a unique
affine feedback Nash equilibrium as in (31a) if F is invert-
ible and S has full row rank.
u? =Kx+ s (31a)
λ ? =(SF−1S>)−1(W −SF−1P)x+ (31b)
(SF−1S>)−1(p−SF−1H) (31c)
where
K =−F−1S>(SF−1S>)−1(W −SF−1P)+F−1P (32a)
s =−F−1S>(SF−1S>)−1(p−SF−1H)+F−1H (32b)
F =

Γu1u11 Γ
u1u2
1 . . . Γ
u1uN
1
Γu2u12 Γ
u2u2
2 . . . Γ
u2uN
2
...
...
. . .
...
ΓuN u1N Γ
uN u2
N . . . Γ
uN uN
N
 (32c)
P =

Γu1x1
Γu2x2
...
ΓuN xN
 H =

Γu11n
Γu21n
...
ΓuN 1n
 (32d)
5.2 Linearly Constrained Quadratic Dynamic Games
A linearly constrained quadratic dynamic game is formu-
lated as following. It is one of the most complicated form of
dynamic games of which we can acquire analytical solution
in theory.
Problem 14 Linearly Constrained Quadratic Dynamic
Games
min
un
Jn(x,u) =
T
∑
k=0
1
2

1
xk
u:,k

>
Γ11n,k Γ
1x
n,k Γ
1u
n,k
Γx1n,k Γ
xx
n,k Γ
xu
n,k
Γu1n,k Γ
ux
n,k Γ
uu
n,k


1
xk
u:,k

(33a)
s.t. xk+1 = Akxk +Bku:,k +bk (33b)
Wn,kx+Sn,ku+ pn,k ≤ 0 (33c)
This problem can be viewed as a static game in u parameter-
ized by x. As developed in detail in Appendix B, the explicit
FNE solution found via Bellman recursion to this problem
is a piecewise affine policy, with polyhedral domains, and
the value functions are piecewise quadratic. However, the
required number of polyhedral domains on the space Xk
can grow exponentially, causing the procedure to be com-
putationally prohibiting. It is reasonable to believe that the
feedback Nash equilibrium of general constrained dynamic
games can be more complex. This fact drives us to seek lo-
cal FNE.
6 Local Feedback Equilibrium
OLNEs solved via projected gradient or DR splitting might
not be applicable to systems with noise. Thus, we aim to find
a local feedback policy around the OLNE that can accom-
modate disturbances of the system to a certain degree. As
discussed above, even for linear-quadratic dynamic games
with polyhedral constraints, explicit feedback strategies can
require exponential computational complexity. In this sec-
tion, we describe a simplified strategy based on linearly con-
strained problems. When the constraints are polyhedral, we
prove that the feedback policy is indeed a local O(ε2)−FNE.
6.1 Stagewise Newton Method for Local Feedback Policy
We introduce the stagewise Newton method for comput-
ing a local feedback policy for Problem 1. The method is
based on the stagewise Newton method for unconstrained
dynamic games from our previous work [10]. The key dif-
ference is that, at each step, an approximated linear equality
constrained quadratic game Problem 13 is solved, instead of
the unconstrained quadratic game in [10].
Suppose a trajectory x¯, u¯ has been found along with the
active constraints at each step. The set of indices of ac-
tive constraints in gk(x¯k, u¯:,k) is denoted a¯k,∀k and we use
ga¯k(xk,u:,k) to indicate the active constraints at x¯, u¯, therefore
ga¯k(x¯k, u¯:,k) = 0.
We inherit the following notation of derivatives for stagewise
Newton method from [10].
Ak =
∂ fk(xk,u:,k)
∂xk
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
Bk =
∂ fk(xk,u:,k)
∂u:,k
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
(34a)
Glk =
 ∂
2 f lk
∂x2k
∂ 2 f lk
∂xk∂u:,k
∂ 2 f lk
∂u:,k∂xk
∂ 2 f lk
∂u2:,k
∣∣∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
, l = 1,2, . . . ,nx (34b)
Rk(δxk,δu:,k) =

[
δxk
δu:,k
]>
G1k
[
δxk
δu:,k
]
...[
δxk
δu:,k
]>
Gnxk
[
δxk
δu:,k
]

(34c)
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Mn,k =

2cn,k
∂cn,k
∂xk
∂cn,k
∂u:,k
∂cn,k
∂xk
> ∂ 2cn,k
∂x2k
∂ 2cn,k
∂xk∂u:,k
∂cn,k
∂u:,k
> ∂ 2cn,k
∂u:,k∂xk
∂ 2cn,k
∂u2:,k

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
(34d)
=

M11n,k M
1x
n,k M
1u
n,k
Mx1n,k M
xx
n,k M
xu
n,k
Mu1n,k M
ux
n,k M
uu
n,k
 .
We introduce new notation related to the derivatives of the
active constraints ak, ∀k ∈ {0,1,2, ...,T}.
W a¯k =
∂ga¯k(x¯k, u¯:,k)
∂x
(35a)
Sa¯k =
∂ga¯k(x¯k, u¯:,k)
∂u
(35b)
pa¯k = g
a¯
k(x¯k, u¯:,k) (35c)
We can form a local linear-quadratic approximation that is
still analytically solvable via dynamic programming as fol-
lowing.
Problem 15 Linear-quadratic approximation to Prob-
lem 1
min
un,:
1
2
T
∑
k=0


1
δxk
δu:,k

>
Mn,k

1
δxk
δu:,k
+M1xn,k∆xk
 (36a)
subject to
δx0 = 0 (36b)
∆x0 = 0 (36c)
δxk+1 = Akδxk +Bkδu:,k (36d)
∆xk+1 = Ak∆xk +Rk(δxk,δu:,k) (36e)
W a¯k δxk +S
a¯
kδuk + p
a¯
k = 0 (36f)
k = 0,1, . . . ,T (36g)
where the states of the dynamic game are given by δxk and
∆xk as
δxk =
T
∑
i=0
∂xk
∂u:,i
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
δu:,i (37a)
∆xlk =
T
∑
i=0
T
∑
j=0
δu>:,i
∂ 2xlk
∂u:,i∂u:, j
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
δu:, j, l = 1,2, . . . ,nx (37b)
The following lemma describes the solution to Problem 15.
Lemma 2 The equilibrium value functions found via the
Bellman recursion (6) for the dynamic game Problem (15)
are denoted as V u¯n,k(·) and Qu¯n,k(·, ·), which can be expressed
as
V u¯n,k(δxk,∆xk) =
1
2
[ 1
δxk
]>
Λn,k
[
1
δxk
]
+Ωn,k∆xk

(38a)
Qu¯n,k(δxk,∆xk,δu:,k) =
1
2


1
δxk
δu:,k

>
Γn,k

1
δxk
δu:,k
+Ωn,k∆xk

(38b)
where the matrices Λn,k, Γn,k, and Ωn,k can be computed in
a backward pass, which also finds a local feedback policy
of the form δu:,k = Kkδxk + sk around this trajectory.
The matrices Λn,k, Γn,k, and Ωn,k in (38) are computed re-
cursively by Λn,T+1 = 0, Ωn,T+1 = 0, and
Ωn,k = M1xn,k +Ωn,k+1Ak (39a)
Dn,k =
nx
∑
l=1
Ωln,k+1G
l
k (39b)
Γn,k = Mn,k
+

Λ11n,k+1 Λ
1x
n,k+1Ak Λ
1x
n,k+1Bk
A>k Λ
x1
n,k+1 A
>
k Λ
xx
n,k+1Ak +D
xx
k A
>
k Λ
xx
n,k+1Bk +D
xu
k
B>k Λ
x1
n,k+1 B
>
k Λ
xx
n,k+1Ak +D
ux
k B
>
k Λ
xx
n,k+1Bk +D
uu
k

(39c)
=

Γ11n,k Γ
1x
n,k Γ
1u1
n,k Γ
1u2
n,k · · · Γ1uNn,k
Γx1n,k Γ
xx
n,k Γ
xu1
n,k Γ
xu2
n,k · · · ΓxuNn,k
Γu11n,k Γ
u1x
n,k Γ
u1u1
n,k Γ
u1u2
n,k · · · Γu1uNn,k
Γu21n,k Γ
u2x
n,k Γ
u2u1
n,k Γ
u2u2
n,k · · · Γu2uNn,k
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
ΓuN 1n,k Γ
uN x
n,k Γ
uN u1
n,k Γ
uN u2
n,k · · · ΓuN uNn,k

(39d)
Fk =

Γu1u1k
Γu2u2k
...
ΓuN uNk
=

Γu1u11k Γ
u1u2
1k · · · Γu1uN1k
Γu2u12k Γ
u2u2
2k · · · Γu2uN2k
...
...
. . .
...
ΓuN u1Nk Γ
uN u2
Nk · · · ΓuN uNNk
 (39e)
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Pk =

Γu1x1k
Γu2x2k
...
ΓuN xNk
 , Hk =

Γu111k
Γu212k
...
ΓuN 1Nk
 (39f)
Kk =−F−1k S>k (SkF−1k S>k )−1(Wk−SkF−1k Pk)+F−1k Pk
(39g)
sk =−F−1k S>k (SkF−1k S>k )−1(pk−SkF−1k Hk)+F−1k Hk
(39h)
Λn,k =
[
1 0 s>k
0 I K>k
]
Γn,k

1 0
0 I
sk Kk
 (39i)
for k = T,T −1, . . . ,0.
Proof. The stagewise Newton method for unconstrained
dynamic game and its solution was proved in [10]. The only
difference in the dynamic programming procedure for Prob-
lem 15 is that an equality constrained static quadratic game
is solved at each time step, resulting in different expressions
for the feedback parameters Kk and sk, which are justified
by the solution of Problem 13. 2
Note that the differential dynamic programming (DDP)
method for unconstrained dynamic games [10] can be
adapted to constrained games in a similar fashion, for the
sake of completeness of generalizing our previous work. As
in the unconstrained dynamic game case, DDP and stage-
wise Newton do not manifest obvious advantages over each
other.
6.2 Remarks on the Feedback Policy by Stagewise Newton
Method
Stagewise Newton method solves a linear equality con-
strained quadratic dynamic game that approximates Prob-
lem 1 around x¯, u¯ and finds a local feedback policy. Without
constraints gk(xk,u:,k), i.e., setting Sk = 0,Wk = 0, pk = 0,
the method reduces to the unconstrained version of stage-
wise Newton method [10]. However, unlike its counterpart
for unconstrained game, because of the introduction of
constraints, the policy found might not be feasible, there-
fore we cannot perform the iterative process as in [10]. We
consider in this paper the case when x¯, u¯ is an OLNE and
the feedback policy found by one backward pass of the
stagewise Newton method. In this case, u¯ will be will be a
fixed-point of the Newton iteration and the feedback policy
simplifies to δu:,k = Kkδxk. Furthermore, the matrices are
computed in O(T ) complexity. The possibility of infeasible
policy remains and is overcome with tightened constraints
as in Section 6.3.
The proposed algorithm neglects the inactive constraints. A
problem arises, in that deviations in the state can cause these
neglected constraints to become violated. A simple method
to ensure feasibility is to tighten the inequality constraints,
as is common in model predictive control [23]. We will see
below that in the case of polyhedral constraints, the feedback
policy is indeed an local O(ε2)-FNE.
6.3 Problems with Polyhedral Constraints
In this section, we introduce a special class of dynamic
problems, restricting to affine dynamics and polyhedral con-
straints, such that the stagewise Newton method can be uti-
lized to find a local O(ε2)-FNE for a partially tightened
problem (defined below). We first introduce a fully tightened
version of a polyhedrally constrained linear dynamic game
Problem 16 Game with tightened polyhedral constraints
min
un,:
Jn,t(x,u) =
T
∑
k=t
cn,k(xk,u:,k) (40a)
s.t. xk+1 = Akxk +Bku:,k +bk (40b)
Wkxk +Sku:,k + pk ≤−γk, (40c)
x0 is fixed. (40d)
Here γk > 0 are vectors used to tighten the inequality con-
straints. As above, say that x¯, u¯ is an OLNE trajectory. We
use superscripts a¯ and i¯ to denote values associated with ac-
tive and inactive constraints on x¯ and u¯. If we find a local
feedback policy using the stagewise Newton method, it can
be shown that it is feasible for the following partially tight-
ened problem:
Problem 17 Game with partially tightened polyhedral
constraints
min
un,:
Jn,t(x,u) =
T
∑
k=t
cn,k(xk,u:,k) (41a)
s.t. xk+1 = Akxk +Bku:,k +bk (41b)
W a¯k xk +S
a¯
ku:,k + p
a¯
k ≤−γ a¯k (41c)
W i¯kxk +S
i¯
ku:,k + p
i¯
k ≤ 0 (41d)
xt is fixed. (41e)
Recall that the dynamics, constraints, and control law are all
affine. Thus, when a local variation of the state ‖xk− x¯‖= ε
happens with a sufficiently small ε , the trajectories remain
feasible.
The next theorem summarizes this local feedback Nash
equilibrium result. The detailed proof can be found in
Appendix A.4.
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Theorem 1 There exists a sufficiently small ε , such that if
‖xt − x¯t‖ ≤ ε , the OLNE u¯, x¯, active/inactive constraints and
local feedback policy φ:,k(xk) = Kkxk + sk found for Prob-
lem 16, is a local feedback O(ε2)-Nash equilibrium for Prob-
lem 17:
Jn,t(xt ,φ:,t:)≤ Jn,t(xt , [ψn,t:,φ−n,t:])+O(ε2), ∀t ∈ {0,1, ...,T}
(42)
for any ψn,: such that the resulting trajectories are feasible
for (41) and remain in a neighborhood of [x¯, u¯].
7 Numerical Examples
We demonstrate the approximated local feedback Nash equi-
librium around an OLNE with a common-property fishery
resource problem and Douglas-Rachford algorithm with a
linear quadratic games with analytically projectable convex
constraints.
7.1 A Common-Property Fishery Resource Problem
The common-property fishery game was considered in
Chapter 13, [2], which is a classic renewable resource man-
age problem that dates back to 1970s. The analysis in [2]
settled at the conclusion that efficient players will drive
some opponents out of the competition and maintain at the
bionomic equilibrium with zero sustained economic rent.
We demonstrate the dynamic equilibrium of two players
jointly utilize the resource for a given period of time.
The game is discretized. Scalars xk and u1,k, u2,k denote the
biomass of fish and fishing effort of two players. The fishing
effort is constrained by 0 ≤ un,k ≤ umaxn . The dynamics of
the system from time 0 to T is given by
xk+1 = xk +
[
g(xk)−
2
∑
n=1
qnun,kxk
]
dt, k = 0,1, ...,T/dt
(43)
where the natural growth rate g(xk) is
g(xk) =
r
h2
(2hxk− x2k)+wk (44)
h is half the maximal biomass the environment can sustain
and r is the maximal growth rate which happens when xk = h.
qn is the catchability coefficient for player n. wk is a I.I.D.
Gaussian noise we injected for simulating a noisy system.
Step profit of each player is modeled as
cn,k(xk,u:,k) = (pnqnxk− en)un,kdt (45)
where pn is the unit price of landed fish and en is the unit
cost of effort.
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Fig. 1. OLNE of projected gradient iterations. 10 trajectories were
sampled from 1,000 iterations and shown in Fig. 1 with more
transparent curves indicating earlier trajectories in the iteration.
As can be seen, both players would wait at the beginning for the
level of fish biomass to rise even after it passes their bionomic
equilibria, since they are managing the resource on a longer term.
Two players’ effort stabilizes in the middle section, which we
believe to be the infinite horizon equilibrium for the game, which
is not within the scope of this paper. In the end, player 1 does not
care about longer term profit, so they maximize the effort. Player
2 would like to keep the biomass further away their bionomic
equilibrium before the final dash, so they reduced effort from time
80 to around 93.
Constants chosen are chosen in favor of player 1.
umax1 = 0.4, u
max
2 = 0.3, r = 8, h = 100,dt = 0.1, T = 100,
q1 = q2 = 0.1, p1 = p2 = 1, e1 = 9, e2 = 11 (46)
The turnpike for a player is the most profitable level of fish
biomass if the player is managing the resource alone. And
the bionomic equilibrium for a player is the minimal fish
biomass that a player can turn a profit.
We first applied the projected gradient method with step-
size 0.01 for 1,000 iterations on the deterministic system
(neglecting wk), finding the OLNE shown in Fig. 1. The cu-
mulative profit and convergence of actions is summarized
in Fig 2. We further applied the stagewise Newton method,
found the local feedback Nash equilibrium and implemented
it for the noisy system, setting the variance of zero-mean
Gaussian noise wk to E{w2k}= 2. The comparison between
OLNE and FNE for noisy system is shown in Fig. 3.
7.2 Linear Quadratic Game with Convex Constraints
When a dynamic linear-quadratic(LQ) game has an convex
constraint set onto which, the projection is analytically solv-
able, both problems in Section 4.2 can be analytically solved
and the Douglas-Rachfor splitting method is preferred.
We demonstrate the DR splitting method on a 2-D locomo-
tion problem with N = 3 players. Each player directly con-
trols its own location. The system state xk ∈ R6 contains N
sets of 2-D coordinates of each player and action un,k ∈ R2
for each players. We use xn,k to denote player n’s coordinate
10
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Fig. 2. Cumulative profit and convergence. The game is formulated
favoring player 1, it is not surprising that over iterations, player 1’s
profit increases while player 2’s decreases as in Fig. 2(a). Fig. 2(b)
shows the distance to the final OLNE as the iteration progresses,
which fits a typical linear convergence pattern.
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(a) OLNE for noisy system
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(b) Local FNE for noisy system
Fig. 3. Local OLNE and FNE for noisy system. Fig. 3(a) shows if
the OLNE is blindly applied, the biomass is susceptible to the noise
and deviates from the OLNE biomass trajectory. Fig. 3(b) shows
the correctional effect of a local FNE with erratic fishing efforts
but keeping the biomass smoother and closer to the deterministic
OLNE.
at step k, naturally we have xk = [x1,k,x2,k,x3,k], where the
variables are all column vectors. The dynamics is simply
xk+1 = I6xk + I6u:,k,k = 0,1, ...,T (47a)
where I6 is a 6× 6 identity matrix. The initial position x0
and each players target position xtn are known. Each player’s
action is subject to a magnitude constraint
∥∥un,k∥∥ ≤ umaxn .
The cost of each player consists of two parts, reaching to
the target and conserving its own energy.
cn,k =
∥∥xn,k− xtn∥∥2+10∥∥un,k∥∥2 , k = 0,1,2, ...,T −1 (48)
cn,T = 1000
∥∥xn,T − xtn∥∥2 , k = T (49)
It is also required that all three players should meet at k = 5,
i.e., x1,5 = x2,5 = x3,5, which makes the problem a coupled
dynamic game problem rather than 3 separated optimal con-
trol problems. The particular constraint also causes the pro-
jected gradient method or Algorithm 1, if applied to the
problem at hand, to require solving a constrained optimal
control problem in each iteration, which needs another itera-
tive procedure. The DR splitting on the other hands, presents
two analytically solvable subproblems. In particular, the cor-
responding Problem 7 is solved via stagewise Newton for
unconstrained game [10] and Problem 8 becomes a simple
projection onto
∥∥un,k∥∥≤ umaxn .
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Fig. 4. Douglas-Rachford splitting for dynamic LQ game with
convex constraints. 11 trajectories were sampled from 10,000 it-
erations and shown in Fig. 4(a) with more transparent curves in-
dicating earlier trajectories in the iteration. The rendezvous point
changed over iteration and all players go straight to target af-
terwards. Fig. 4(b) shows the distance to the final OLNE as the
iteration progresses, which is proof that the algorithm converges.
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Fig. 5. Magnitudes of action and cumulative cost over iterations.
11 intermediate results were sampled from 10,000 iterations and
shown in Fig. 5 with more transparent curves indicating earlier
trajectories in the iteration. The magnitude is bounded by umaxn as
expected in Fig. 5(a). Fig. 5(b) shows the total costs reduce for
all players as the rendezvous point changes over iterations.
The parameters are chosen as
T = 10,x0 = [1,1,−2,0,4,0],
xt = [xt1,x
t
2,x
t
3] = [4,12,−2,10,10,10],
umax1 = u
max
2 = u
max
3 = 2, (50)
We applied the DR splitting method with the splitting
scheme in Section 4.2. We found η = 10−4 and α = 0.5
produced stable iteration and solution. 104 iterations were
performed and shown in Fig. 4.
8 Conclusion and Extensions
We demonstrated how the projected gradient method and
the Douglas-Rachford algorithm can be used to compute
open-loop Nash equilibrium of constrained dynamic games.
These algorithms converge locally with a linear rate, and our
algorithms require linear iteration complexity in the hori-
zon. We showed how the OLNE solutions computed from
these methods can be combined with the stagewise New-
ton method to find a local feedback strategy. In the case of
11
polyhedrally constrained games with linear dynamics, was
saw that this feedback policy provides an approximate feed-
back Nash equilibrium. The approximation properties of this
feedback policy for more general nonlinearly constrained
games is worth further study. Another promising direction
would be to utilize methods from model predictive control
to compute approximate feedback equilibria.
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A Auxiliary Proofs
A.1 Problem 5 is Equivalent Problem 6
Because the normal cone of intersections of convex sets is
equal to the sum of normal cones of the convex sets [25],
the inclusion problem Problem 6 is equivalent to
−ηJxu([x?,u?]) ∈ND∩G([x?,u?]) (A.1)
According to the definition of normal cone
ND∩G([x?,u?]) :=
{[y,z]|− [y,z]>([x,y]− [x?,u?]), ∀ [x,y] ∈D∩G} (A.2)
(A.1) is further equivalent to
ηJxu([x?,u?])>([x,u]− [x?,u?])≥ 0, ∀[x,y] ∈D∩G
(A.3)
which is the VI problem Problem 5.
When Jxu is strongly monotone, D and G are convex, Jxu,
NG andND are all maximally monotone operators. Because
adding operators preserve maximal monotonicity, so we can
apply DR splitting algorithm to Problem 6.
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A.2 Resolvents of Operators in Problem 6
The resolvent of a set-valued/single-valued monotone map
Φ is defined by
rΦ := (I+Φ)−1 (A.4)
which is single-valued and non-expansive [15].
A.2.1 Resolvent of the normal cone of a convex set
Suppose we have a convex set X . Following the definition,
the resolvent of NX (x)
y = rNG(x) = (I+NX )−1(x) (A.5a)
(A.5b)
which is equivalent to
x− y ∈NX (y) (A.6)
(x− y)>(z− y)≤ 0, ∀z ∈ X (A.7)
This VI problem is equivalent to the optimization of a pro-
jection of x onto X
min
z
y = ‖x− z‖ (A.8a)
s.t. z ∈ X (A.8b)
Therefore the resolvent of a normal cone of a convex set is
the projection onto the convex set. This justifies Problem 8
and 10.
A.2.2 Resolvent of a gradient vector
We study the resolvent of the gradient operator ηJ (u) of a
game as in (7). Suppose u = rηJ (x), equivalently we have
u+ηJ (u) = x (A.9a)
Consider a static game problem
min
un
Jn(u)+
1
2η
‖u− x‖2 (A.10a)
whose Nash equilibrium is equivalent to the solution of
ηJ (u)+u− x = 0 (A.11)
which is equivalent to (A.9a). Therefore, the resolvent is
equivalent to the solution of a static game.
Based on the arguement of Section A.2.1 and A.2.2, the
subproblems of Section 4 can be justified.
A.3 Generative Cone Condition to Linear Inequalities
Lemma 3 A generative cone condition, where S has full
row rank
x ∈ cone{S>} (A.12)
can be equivalently expressed as
Lx≤ 0 (A.13)
where
L =

−(SS>)−1S
I−S>(SS>)−1S
−I+S>(SS>)−1S
 (A.14)
Proof. The generative condition is equivalent to
x = S>λ (A.15a)
λ ≥ 0 (A.15b)
which is equivalent to
∃M s.t. Mx = λ ≥ 0 (A.16)
(I−S>M)x = 0 (A.17)
Choose M = (SS>)−1S, the equivalent conditions can be
easily checked
Mx = (SS>)−1Sx = (SS>)−1SS>λ = λ ≥ 0 (A.18a)
Given the SVD decomposition of S
S =U
[
Σ 0
][V>1
V>2
]
(A.19)
It is easy to check that
(I−S>M) = I−S>(SS>)−1S =V2V>2 (A.20)
Since V>2 x = 0, (A.16) is true. 2
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A.4 Proof of Theorem 1
First we show that the policy produces feasible trajectories.
Recall that [x¯, u¯] is an OLNE for the equality-constrained
problem. Thus, it is a fixed-point of Newton’s method, so
that the feedback policy has the form:
u:,k = φ:,k(xk) = u¯k +Kk(xk− x¯k). (A.21)
By construction, (36f) ensures that active constraints for
[x¯, u¯] remain active for [x,u].
Now we analyze the inactive constraints. Note that [x¯, u¯]
satisfies
W i¯k x¯k +S
i¯
ku¯:,k + p
i¯
k ≤−γ i¯k < 0. (A.22)
Furthermore, if ‖xt− x¯t‖≤ ε the affine dynamics and polyhe-
dral constraints imply that we must have that ‖u:,k− u¯:,k‖=
O(ε) and ‖xk− x¯k‖= O(ε) for all k ≥ t. It follows that for
sufficiently small ε , the constraint (41d) holds. Thus, the
feedback policy produces a feasible trajectory.
Finally, we show that the approximate feedback equilibrium
condition, (42), holds. Note that left inequality always holds
by construction, so we only need to prove the right inequal-
ity.
Fix a player n and a time t ≥ 0. Assume that the other
players are using the strategy profile φ−n,t:T . Then, with the
strategies of the other players fixed, the policy, ψn,t:, that
minimizes Jn,t(xt , [ψn,t:,φ−n,t:]) can be computed from the
following optimal control problem:
min
un,t:T
T
∑
k=t
cn,k(xk,(un,k,φ−n,k(xk))) (A.23a)
s.t. u−n,k = φ−n,k(xk) (A.23b)
xk+1 = Akxk +Bku:,k +bk (A.23c)
W a¯k xk +S
a¯
ku:,k + p
a¯
k ≤−γ a¯k (A.23d)
W i¯kxk +S
i¯
ku:,k + p
i¯
k ≤ 0 (A.23e)
xt is fixed. (A.23f)
The quadraticization around [x¯, u¯] of the optimal control
problem (A.23) is exactly the same as that of player n in
Problem 17. Thus, when all other players follow the stage-
wise Newton strategy, the minimizerψn,t: should be the same
as φn,t:, since player n will have no incentive to change its
strategy on the quadraticized problem. Then, to show that
the strategy is an approximate feedback equilibrium, it suf-
fices to show that φn,t: is approximately optimal. The bound
on optimality follows from the general result on parameter-
ized optimization from Lemma 5 below. 2
A.5 Lemmas on Optimization Approximation
In this section, we present Lemma 5 which is used to prove
Theorem 1, along with supporting results.
Let f (x,u) be a strongly convex with respect to u in a neigh-
borhood of (x¯, u¯). Assume that u¯ minimizes f (x¯,u) with re-
spect to u. Let fˆ (x,u) be its quadratic approximation around
the nominal point (x¯, u¯). Let C(x) = {u|Wx+ Su+ p ≤ 0}.
Define the policies by
ψ(x) = argmin
u∈C(x)
f (x,u) (A.24a)
ρ(x) = argmin
u∈C(x)
fˆ (x,u) (A.24b)
Note that ρ(x) has the form
u = ρ(x) = K(A )x+h(A ), (A.25)
each pair (K(A ),h(A )) corresponds to the active indices,
A , of (x,u).
Let φ(x) = K( ¯A )x+ h( ¯A ), where ¯A is the active set of
(u¯, x¯). Note that in the game context, this strategy corre-
sponds precisely to the individual players’ approximate strat-
egy computed by stagewise Newton methods.
The eventual goal is to show that φ and ψ give similar costs.
As an intermediate result, we show that ψ and ρ give similar
costs.
Lemma 4 Let ‖x− x¯‖= ‖δx‖= ε . Say that f (x,u) has Lip-
schitz second derivatives and is strongly convex with respect
to u in a neighborhood of (x,u). Further assume that C(x)
is non-empty for all x in this neighborhood. Then the fol-
lowing bounds hold:
f (x,ψ(x)) ≤ f (x,ρ(x)) ≤ f (x,ψ(x)) + O(ε2) (A.26)
Proof. Note that the first inequality of (A.26) is immediate
from the definition of ψ . Thus, we focus on the second
inequality.
We will show that ψ(x)− ρ(x) = O(ε). To do this, we
will show that both functions are Lipschitz and that φ(x¯) =
ρ(x¯) = u¯.
Note that ψ(x) is the solution to the following VI
∇u f (x,u)>(v−u) ∀v ∈C(x). (A.27)
By strong convexity and differentiability, ∇2u f (x,u) is pos-
itive definite. This implies that for any matrix, B with full
column rank, we have that B>∇2u f (x,u)B is also positive
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definite, and thus has positive determinant. Then general re-
sults on perturbed VIs show that ψ(x) must be Lipschitz.
See [26]. Furthermore, by construction ψ(x¯) = u¯.
By the same reasoning, we must also have that ρ(x) is Lip-
schitz and again by construction we have that ρ(x¯) = u¯. It
follows that ρ(x) = u¯+O(ε). Thus
ρ(x)−ψ(x) = ρ(x)− u¯+ u¯−ρ(x) = O(ε).
Now we will prove the upper bound. For compact notation,
let u˜ = ψ(x) and let u = ρ(x). Then we have the approxi-
mation:
f (x,u) = f (x, u˜)+∇u f (x, u˜)>(u− u˜)+O(ε2).
By optimality of u˜ and feasibility of u, we have that
0≤ ∇u f (x, u˜)>(u− u˜).
Thus, the proof will be completed if we can bound this term
above by O(ε2).
Let J = ∇u f . Since J is differentiable and u− u˜ = O(ε),
we have that
∇u f (x, u˜) = ∇u f (x,u)+O(ε)
= J (x¯, u¯)+ ∂J
∂x
δx+
∂J
∂u
δu+O(ε),
where the partial derivatives are evaluated at (x¯, u¯).
Thus, the desired bound is given by
∇u f (x, u˜)>(u− u˜)
=
(
J (x¯, u¯)+ ∂J
∂x
δx+
∂J
∂u
δu
)>
(u− u˜)+O(ε2)
≤ O(ε2),
where the second inequality due to optimality of u for the
corresponding affine VI. 2
Now we present the optimization approximation result re-
quired for Theorem 1.
Lemma 5 Assume that φ(x) ∈ C(x) and let ‖x− x¯‖ ≤ ε .
Then the following bounds hold.
f (x,ψ(x))≤ f (x,φ(x))≤ f (x,ψ(x))+O(ε2). (A.28)
Proof . The bound on the left holds automatically since φ(x)
is feasible and ψ(x) is the corresponding optimal solution.
Specializing Lemma 4 to the case of optimization implies
that f (x,ψ(x)) = f (x,ρ(x)) +O(ε2). Thus, it suffices to
show that
f (x,φ(x)) = f (x,ρ(x))+O(ε2). (A.29)
Let x(θ) = (1−θ)x¯+θx, let u(θ) = ρ(x(θ)), let A (θ) be
the active set for (x(θ),u(θ)), and let I (θ) be the inactive
set. We will show that the active sets only switch a finite
number of times.
We claim that for each subset ˆA ⊂ {1, . . . ,nc}, the set
Θ( ˆA ) = {θ |A (θ) = ˆA } is convex. In particular, Θ( ˆA )
must be an interval.
Proposition 7.10 of [23] implies that the set of x such that
(x,ρ(x)) has active set ˆA is a polyhedron. Since eachΘ( ˆA )
is the projection of the intersection of this set with a line,
we must have that Θ( ˆA ) is convex.
Since there are at most 2nc active sets, it follows that there
are sets A1,A2, . . . ,Ak with k ≤ 2nc such that Θ(Ai) are
intervals that partition [0,1]. These sets can be arranged so
that θi ≤ θi+1 for θi ∈Θ(Ai) and θi+1 ∈Θ(Ai+1).
Let ρ i be the affine strategy corresponding to Ai. Then by
construction, we have
f (x,φ(x))− f (x,ρ(x)) =
k−1
∑
i=1
( f (x,ρ i(x))− f (x,ρ i+1(x))).
(A.30)
These active sets have the property that either Ai ⊂Ai+1 or
Ai⊃Ai+1. EitherAi must be open on the right orAi+1 must
be open on the left. Consider the case that Ai is open on the
right. (The case of Ai+1 open on the left is similar.) Then
the boundary between Ai and Ai+1 is a point θˆ ∈Ai+1. By
continuity, all of the constraints in Ai must be tight at θˆ .
Thus, we must have that Ai ⊂Ai+1.
Consider the case thatAi⊂Ai+1. (The other case is similar.)
In particular, the constraints from Ai must be active for
both corresponding VI solutions. Thus, if S+Ai is the Moore-
Penrose pseudoinverse of SAi and RAi is a matrix with full
column rank such that R(RAi) = N (SAi), we must have
that
ρ j(x) =−S+Ai(WAix+ pAi)+RAiz j,
for j = i, i+1, and some vectors z j. It follows that
ρ i+1(x)−ρ i(x) = RAi(zi+1− zi) (A.31)
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Let θi ∈Θ(Ai) be some value for which Ai is the active set
for x(θi) =: xi, and let ui be the corresponding optimizer.
Note that ‖x¯− x(θi)‖ ≤ ε . It follows that
∇u f (x,ρ i(x)) = ∇u fˆ (xi,ui)+O(ε).
Since ui minimizes fˆ (xi,u), with Ai active, we must have
that
∇u fˆ (xi,ui)>(ui+RAiz−ui)≥ 0,
for all sufficiently small z. It follows that ∇u fˆ (xi,ui)>RAi =
0.
Thus, we can get the bound:
f (x,ρ i+1(x))
= f (x,ρ i(x))
+∇u f (x,ρ i(x))>(ρ i+1(x)−ρ i(x))+O(ε2)
= f (x,ρ i(x))+
∇u fˆ (xi,ui)>RAi(zi+1− zi)+O(ε2)
= f (x,ρ i(x))+O(ε2). (A.32)
An analogous argument argument in the case of Ai ⊃Ai+1
shows that the same bound holds.
Plugging (A.32) into (A.30) completes the proof. 2
B Parametric Games and Feedback Equilibrium in De-
tails
This section contains the detailed development for Section 5.
Some problem definitions and lemmas are restated so this
section is self-contained for ease of reading. We study in
this section some basic parametric quadratic games with
polyhedral constraints to gain insight of the feedback Nash
equilibrium of dynamic games in general. We assume each
player’s cost function Jn(x,u) is continuous and strictly con-
vex throughout this section.
B.1 Linear Equality Constrained Quadratic Parametric
Game
Problem 18 is a basic form that is encountered when
approximating a constrained dynamic game, where
u = [u>1 ,u
>
2 , ...,u
>
N , ]
> collects all players’ action and x is
a vector parameter. An FNE policy u = φ(x) is desired.
This game has an explicit analytical solution with simple
assumptions.
Problem 18 Linear equality constrained quadratic para-
metric game
min
un
Jn(x,u) =
1
2

1
x
u

>
Γ11n Γ1xn Γ1un
Γx1n Γxxn Γxun
Γu1n Γuxn Γuun


1
x
u
 (B.1a)
s.t. Wx+Su+ p = 0 (B.1b)
The following lemma describes its solution.
Lemma 6 Given playerwise convexity of objective func-
tions, i.e., Γuun are positive definite, Problem 18 has a unique
affine feedback Nash equilibrium as in (B.2a) if F is invert-
ible and S has full row rank.
u? =Kx+ s (B.2a)
λ ? =(SF−1S>)−1(W −SF−1P)x+ (B.2b)
(SF−1S>)−1(p−SF−1H) (B.2c)
where
K =−F−1S>(SF−1S>)−1(W −SF−1P)+F−1P (B.3a)
s =−F−1S>(SF−1S>)−1(p−SF−1H)+F−1H (B.3b)
F =

Γu1u11 Γ
u1u2
1 . . . Γ
u1uN
1
Γu2u12 Γ
u2u2
2 . . . Γ
u2uN
2
...
...
. . .
...
ΓuN u1N Γ
uN u2
N . . . Γ
uN uN
N
 (B.3c)
P =

Γu1x1
Γu2x2
...
ΓuN xN
 H =

Γu11n
Γu21n
...
ΓuN 1n
 (B.3d)
Proof. The feedback Nash equilibrium can be solved via
solving the KKT conditions of all players [20]. The La-
grangians can be formulated as
Jn(x,u) =
1
2

1
x
u

>
Γ11n Γ1xn Γ1un
Γx1n Γxxn Γxun
Γu1n Γuxn Γuun


1
x
u
+ (B.4a)
λ>(Wx+Su+ p) (B.4b)
Therefore the KKT conditions are
∂
un
Ln(x,u) = Γunxn x+
N
∑
j
Γunu jn u j +Γun1n +(S
ncun)>λ
(B.5a)
n = 1,2, ...,N (B.5b)
0 =Wx+Su+ p (B.5c)
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Thus, for any λ , the unique solution (B.5a) for u is given by
u = −F−1(Px+ h+ S>λ ). Plugging this result into (B.5c)
and solving for λ gives
λ ? = (SF−1S>)−1(W −SF−1P)x+
(SF−1S>)−1(p−SF−1H) (B.6)
Plugging this back into the expression for u gives the result.
2
B.2 Linearly Constrained Quadratic Parametric Game
The more generalized problem with inequality constraints
are studied in this section. Related problems are studied and
the piecewise affine solution was recognized in the varia-
tional inequality literature [26,27]. Our analysis focuses on
games which in addition, recognizes the piecewise quadratic
value functions. We inherit the notation of u,x,Γ,F,P,H and
φ from Section B.1. Such problems serve as a backbone
for analyzing FNE for dynamic games when we solve the
static game (6c) formed by the state-action value function
at a stage.
Problem 19 Linearly constrained quadratic parametric
game
min
un
Jn(x,u) =
1
2

1
x
u

>
Γ11n Γ1xn Γ1un
Γx1n Γxxn Γxun
Γu1n Γuxn Γuun


1
x
u
 (B.7a)
s.t. Wx+Su+ p≤ 0 (B.7b)
We use X and U to indicate the feasible sets of x and u, i.e.,
X = {x | ∃ u s.t. Wx+Su+ p≤ 0} (B.8a)
U = {u | ∃ x s.t. Wx+Su+ p≤ 0} (B.8b)
Note that we do not lose generality without explicit linear
equality constraints, since a linear equality constraint can
be equivalently formulated with two inequality constraints.
The following lemma and proof offers a descriptive solution
to this problem.
Lemma 7 Given playerwise convexity of objective func-
tions, i.e., Γuun are positive definite, Problem 19 has a piece-
wise affine feedback Nash equilibrium u = φ ?(x) on a finite
polyhedral partition of X if and only if F is invertible.
Proof. Assume S has nc rows and we use Enc to indicate the
power set of {1,2, ...,nc}. For a set of indices a ∈ Enc , we
use Wa, Sa and pa to denote picking the corresponding rows.
The solution to Problem 19 can be found via the following
procedure.
Pick one element a∈Enc , which we suppose to be the indices
of active constraints, and solve a linear equality constrained
quadratic parametric game with the method in Section B.1
as following
min
un
Jn(x,u) =
1
2

1
x
u

>
Γ11n Γ1xn Γ1un
Γx1n Γxxn Γxun
Γu1n Γuxn Γuun


1
x
u
 (B.9a)
s.t. Wax+Sau+ pa = 0 (B.9b)
We obtain an affine policy u = Kax+ sa and the matrices
F , P, H following Lemma 6. Note that we are adding sub-
scribes a to indicate values found associated with the active
constraints set of a.
We apply the optimality conditions of VI problem [15] to
find the set in which the policy is an equilibrium in terms
of x {
Wx+S(Kax+ sa)+ p≤ 0
−(F(Kax+ sa)+Px+H) ∈ cone{S>a }
(B.10)
where cone{S>a } means the cone generated by the rows of
Sa. Condition (B.10) can be reformulated as a polyhedral
constraint Lax+ la ≤ 0, since the second condition is equiva-
lent to an linear inequality as shown in Appendix A.3, where
La =

W +SKa
(SaS>a )−1Sa(FKa+P)
[I−S>a (SaS>a )−1Sa](FKa+P)
[−I+S>a (SaS>a )−1Sa](FKa+P)
 (B.11a)
la =

Ssa+ p
(SaS>a )−1Sa(Fsa+H)
[I−S>a (SaS>a )−1Sa](Fsa+H)
[−I+S>a (SaS>a )−1Sa](Fsa+H)
 (B.11b)
Hence we have found an affine policy u = Kax+ sa on a
polyhedral region Xa := {x | Lax+ la ≤ 0} in X . In the case
of Xa = /0, the policy is not an equilibrium.
The procedure can be repeated for all combinations of active
constraints, i.e., ∀a ∈ Enc . For any x ∈ X , there exists an
equilibrium u?(x) and a set of active constraints, therefore x
must fall in one of the Xa. Because there are a finite number
of combinations of active constraints, a finite number of
partitions of X with Xa and corresponding equilibria policy
in each partition can be found. 2
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B.3 Linearly Constrained Piecewise Quadratic Parametric
Game
We focus on static game problems where each player’s cost
function Jn(x,u) is continuous, strictly convex and piecewise
quadratic on a polyhedral partition P . Due to the complexity
of the problem, we refrain from obtaining explicit solutions,
but study the properties of the solution in this section.
Problem 20 Linearly Constrained Piecewise Quadratic
Parametric Game
min
un
Jn(x,u) (B.12a)
s.t. z = [x,u] ∈ P = {Zi|i ∈ I} (B.12b)
Z = {[x,y]|Wix+Siu+ pi ≤ 0} (B.12c)
I is an index set (B.12d)
Assume all players share the same polyhedral partition
W.L.O.G and that J (u) is strongly monotone for any given
x to guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a solution.
In each partition Zi, the problem reduces to a linearly
constrained quadratic parametric game as Problem 19, and
Fi,Pi,Hi are inherited from Section B.1, where the subscript
i denotes the values in Zi. Suppose there are nP polyhedral
partitions, i.e., I = 1,2, ...,nP. The exact quadratic expres-
sion is suppressed. We define an auxiliary problem for each
i ∈ I .
Problem 21 Auxiliary problem Pi
min
un
Jn(x,u) (B.13a)
s.t. z ∈ Z = {[x,y] |Wix+Siu+ pi ≤ 0} (B.13b)
Each auxiliary problem can be solved as in Section B.2,
obtaining a piecewise affine policy and piecewise quadratic
value functions. Since Problems 20 and 19 are closely con-
nected, it is sensible to study the connection between the
solutions of these two problems.
We define the concept of active polyhedrons Ap([x,u]) for
[x,u] in P as the set of indices i ∈ I such that Zi con-
tains [x,u], i.e., A([x,u]) = {i |Wix+Siu+ pi ≤ 0}. The next
lemma explains how to recover the solution to Problem 20
from the auxiliary problems. We use the U(x) to indicate the
set of feasible u with given x and define Ui(x) := {u | [x,u]∈
Zi}.
The following lemma answers the question of how to solve
the equilibrium of Problem 20 for a given x with the help of
auxiliary problems Problem 21.
Lemma 8 u?(x) is the open-loop Nash equilibrium to Prob-
lem 20 given parameter x if and only if it is the solution to
Pi,∀i ∈ A([x,u?(x)]).
Proof. Because for any given x there is a unique solution
for Problem 20, a local solution is also the global solution.
The equivalent VI problem for finding the local solution to
Problem 20 is
find u? s.t. J (u?)>(u−u?)≥ 0 (B.14a)
∀u in a neighborhood of u?(x) (B.14b)
The condition (B.14b) can be expanded to ∀u∈∪ Ui(x),∀i∈
Ap([x,u?(x)]). Due to the same argument that local and
global solution are equivalent, this expansion does not
change the solution found. Therefore, (B.14) is equivalent
to u?(x) being the solution to Pi simultaneously. We can
find the solution of Problem 20 via the solutions of Pi. 2
Next we focus on finding the feedback Nash equilibrium in
terms of x. Suppose there are a total of nc inequalities. The
inequalities defining all partitions can be collected together
as
W =

W1
W2
...
Wnc
 S =

S1
S2
...
Snc
 p =

p1
p2
...
pnc
 (B.15)
Therefore we can create a one-to-one mapping from an index
set j ∈ {1,2, ...,nc} to the inequality Wjx+S j + p j ≤ 0. For
any pair of (x,u), we can check the partition(s) it is living
in and collect the indices in Ap([x,u]), and check the active
constraints and collect them in Ac([x,u]). We call Ac([x,u])
acitve inequalities. Note that though Ap([x,u]) and Ac([x,u])
are tied to pairs of [x,u], there could only be a finite number
of different Ap([x,u]) and Ac([x,u]) since there are only a fi-
nite number of partitions and inequality constraints. In other
words, we can find a finite number of representative pairs
of [xk,uk],k = 1,2, ...,ns, such that Sp = {Ap([xk,uk]) | k ∈
{1,2, ...,ns}} and Sc = {Ac([xk,uk]) | k ∈ {1,2, ...,ns}} con-
tain all possible active polyhedrons and active constraints
combinations. We can get rid of the dependency on (x,u),
use the index k to indicate different feasible active polyhe-
drons Ap(k) and feasible active constraints Ac(k). Finding
the sets Sp and Sc requires studying the structure of the
polyhedral partition P , which is not within the scope of this
paper.
The next lemma describes the feedback Nash equilibrium of
Problem 20.
Lemma 9 Given playerwise convexity of objective func-
tions, i.e., Γuun are positive definite, Problem 20 has a piece-
wise affine feedback Nash equilibrium u? = φ ?(x) on a fi-
nite polyhedral partition of X if and only if Fi is invertible
∀i ∈ I .
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Proof. Similar to the proof for Lemma 7, we describe a
procedure for finding affine policies and their correspond-
ing region of x where they are feedback Nash equilibrium.
Then we conclude by arguing all x ∈ X are included in the
procedure.
We iterate through all ns pairs of Ap(k) and Ac(k). For each
k, we can solve for an affine policy u? = Kkx+ sk with the
feasible active inequalities Ac(k) and the objective functions
of all players as they constitute an instance of Problem 13.
To find the region where this policy is indeed an FNE, we
need to solve the corresponding optimality conditions{
Wix+Si(Kkx+ sk)+ pi ≤ 0,∀i ∈ Ap(k)
−(Fi(Kkx+ sk)+Pix+Hi) ∈ cone{S>i,a},∀i ∈ Ap(k)
(B.16)
where Si,k means picking the rows of active inequalities in
Si that are also in Ap(k). The second condition (B.16) can
be expressed with linear inequalities as in Appendix A.3,
therefore the feasible region Xk, if non-empty, is polyhedral,
and u? = Kkx+ sk is the FNE in this region. We omit the
explicit expression here.
This procedure can be repeated ∀k ∈ {1,2, ...,ns}. For any
x in X , we can find u?(x) via a solver for monotone VI
problems, find the active polyhedrons and active inequalities,
therefore the k. The solution [x,u?(x)] is covered by the
condition (B.16) with k because they share the same local
optimality condition. Note that such procedure may require
exponentially many steps w.r.t. the number of polyhedrons
and inequality constraints. 2
B.4 Linearly Constrained Quadratic Dynamic Games
Now that we are equipped with some basic results, we can
move on to dynamic games. A linearly constrained quadratic
dynamic game is formulated as following. It is one of the
most complicated form of dynamic games of which we can
acquire analytical solution in theory. We briefly discuss the
dynamic programming solution to such problems.
Problem 22 Linearly Constrained Quadratic Dynamic
Games
min
un
Jn(x,u) =
T
∑
k=0
1
2

1
xk
u:,k

>
Γ11n,k Γ
1x
n,k Γ
1u
n,k
Γx1n,k Γ
xx
n,k Γ
xu
n,k
Γu1n,k Γ
ux
n,k Γ
uu
n,k


1
xk
u:,k

(B.17a)
s.t. xk+1 = Akxk +Bku:,k +bk (B.17b)
Wn,kx+Sn,ku+ pn,k ≤ 0 (B.17c)
The first static problem required to be solved by dynamic
programming is a piecewise quadratic, resulting in a piece-
wise affine policy and piecewise quadratic value functions
on XT , which is the space of xT . Based on the linear dynam-
ics and constraints at step T −1, we can form a polyhedral
partition for [xT−1,uT−1], resulting in the next static game
to be a linearly constrained piecewise quadratic parametric
game. As we have seen in Section B.2, the solution remains
to be a piecewise affine policy and quadratic value func-
tions. Therefore, the backward pass by dynamic program-
ming can be done obtaining a series of piecewise quadratic
value functions with linear inequality constraints. However,
the number of partitions on each space Xk can grow expo-
nentially causing the procedure to be computationally pro-
hibiting. It is reasonable to believe that the feedback Nash
equilibrium of general constrained dynamic games can be
more complex. This fact drives us to seek local FNE.
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